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Citizenship: Chinese

Education

University of Zurich and Swiss Finance Institute 2021 – 2027 (expected)
Ph.D. in Finance
Advisors: Per Östberg, Steven Ongena

University of Zurich 2018 – 2020
M.A. in Banking and Finance, *summa cum laude*
Minor in Quantitative Finance

Chongqing University 2013 – 2017
Bachelor of Engineering

References

Prof. Per Östberg
Associate Professor of Finance
University of Zurich and SFI
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Prof. Steven Ongena
Professor of Banking
University of Zurich and SFI
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Prof. Andreas Fuster
Professor of Finance
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Research Fields

Primary: Financial Intermediation, Banking, Information in Credit Markets
Secondary: Corporate Finance, Empirical Credit Markets

Job Market Paper

The Retreat of Local Banking: Spillover Effects on SME Credit (with Lorenzo Ferrante)

As technological transformation leads banks to retreat from local markets, in a frictionless credit market, firms can be expected to rely on other lenders to step in as substitutes. Instead, using Italian loan-level data with lenders' default forecasts, we find that when a bank leaves a municipality, an affected firm's incumbent co-lenders act as complements and cut credit as well. One year after the exit, incumbent co-lenders account for 69 percent of the decline in the firm's credit from its incumbent banks, and relative to their other borrowers in the same municipality, they cut credit to affected firms by an extra 4.2 percent. The cut reflects both an increase in borrower risk and a deterioration of lender information: affected firms default more often, and the co-lenders' default forecasts become less accurate. Co-lenders with a branch in the municipality lose little forecast accuracy and cut about half as much as those without one, implying that lost information accounts for 29 percent of the cut. Lending by a firm's other banks is thus complementary to local banks' presence, implying that branch closures generate negative externalities across the wider credit market.

Working Papers

Impeded Flights in European Sovereign Debt Markets (with Lorenzo Ferrante, Per Östberg and Thomas Richter)

Theory predicts that yield shocks trigger flights from risky to safe assets. In the European sovereign bond market, these flights are impeded: after stress events, trading volume falls by 21–31% over the following week rather than increasing. The mechanism is a collapse in liquidity supply: bid-ask spreads nearly double and market depth falls by about a fifth. Exploiting that the same bond trades on both a domestic and a pan-European MTS platform, we show that spreads widen more and volume drops more on the domestic platform, where market makers hold more of their own sovereign's debt. We also provide evidence that these secondary-market freezes contributed to the rise in banks' home bias during the crisis. Bank-dealers' concentrated exposure to sovereign risk can freeze a central secondary market when rebalancing is most needed.

Does Competition Make Banks Better Informed? (with Lorenzo Ferrante)

Banking theory has long debated whether competition erodes banks' private information about their borrowers, but this information is rarely observed. We use AnaCredit, in which several banks report their own probability of default (PD) for the same firm in the same month. Disagreement among these PDs predicts default beyond the lenders' consensus and thus carries private information. PDs rank borrowers less well in more competitive markets. Comparing banks that lend to the same firm gives a different angle. A bank's PD relative to its co-lenders' predicts default on its own loans more strongly where more banks compete. Relationship lenders' informational advantage does not diminish with competition. Competition does not appear to erode banks' private information.

Work in Progress

Winners Are Not Cursed (with Lorenzo Ferrante)

Classic theory warns that winning a contested borrower is bad news, because the winner is the most optimistic lender (Broecker, 1990; Shaffer, 1998). Preliminary results show that optimism can nonetheless carry information: conditional on the lenders' average PD, a lower PD from a firm's most optimistic lender predicts lower default, while the most pessimistic lender's PD adds no predictive power. The project asks when a winner's optimism reflects private information that outweighs the winner's curse, and separates the curse from search-based adverse selection, which arises when riskier firms approach more banks.

Presentations

2026 IBEFA Summer Meeting at the WEAI Annual Conference, Denver†; SFI Research Days; Internal Seminar, European Central Bank*; Brown Bag Lunch Seminar, University of Zurich

2025 Annual Financial Markets and Liquidity Conference, Budapest; Rising Scholars in Finance Conference, Zurich (poster)†

Earlier Brown Bag Lunch Seminar, University of Zurich (2022, 2024)

† also discussant * presented by coauthor

Fellowships and Awards

Award for Excellence in Teaching Support, Department of Finance, UZH 2023/2024
Swiss Finance Institute PhD Scholarship 2021 – 2022

Teaching Experience

University of Zurich

Empirical Corporate Finance (Ph.D.) 2024 – present
Teaching assistant; teaching evaluation 6.0 / 6.0

Seminar in Takeovers, Restructuring and Corporate Governance (M.A.) 2020 – present
Teaching assistant

Skills

Programming: Stata, Python, R, LaTeX
Languages: Mandarin (native), English (fluent), German (B1)